Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) is a provisional solution for Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) security loopholes present in already widely deployed legacy 802.11 wireless devices. In this work, we model and analyse the computational complexity of TKIP security mechanism and propose an optimised implementation, called LOTKIP, to decrease processing overhead for better energy efficient security performance. The LOTKIP improvements are based on minimising key mixing redundancy and a novel frame encapsulation with low overhead. We simulate and compare LOTKIP with baseline TKIP in terms of complexity and energy consumption for ad hoc wireless network security. From simulation results, we demonstrate that LOTKIP executes with lower computational complexity, hence, with faster encryption time and more energy-efficient.
INTRODUCTION
As a security enhancement for IEEE 802.11 wireless networks, WiFi Protected Access (WPA) use Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) mechanism for encryption. WPA is also optional in the new IEEE 802.11i security standard (referred as WPA2) [11] . TKIP mechanism is a provisional scheme used to strengthen security of IEEE 802.11 WLAN and is implemented through software advances. It reuses RC4 of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol as its core, but introduces upgrading in the areas of message integrity, IV creation, and key management and plays the part of a wrapper to increase the security of WEP [1] . However, TKIP security mechanism consumes precious CPU cycles in 802.11b wireless network devices as it incurs extra computation and communication overhead. For battery-powered and low processing capacity wireless devices, TKIP encryption/decryption operations cause extra delays in communication, decrease in effective bandwidth and increase energy consumption. The encapsulation process and message integrity check increase the size of transmitted packets, which in turn lower the effective bandwidth and increase the communication cost. Further, executing wireless security protocol, even including key exchanges, leads to extra network traffic. Hence, minimising security overhead and optimising power consumption are important challenges to wireless security design.
Supplementary power and resource utilization drain that TKIP security enhancements impose require research attention. There is a need for comprehensive quantitative security and complexity analysis of TKIP key mixing function and encapsulation process, even so cryptographic review thus far suggests it achieves its fundamental design goals. Overall processing limitations as well as energy consumption need to be alleviated with more efficient TKIP security implementations, which is especially desirable in battery-powered wireless devices for certain ad hoc wireless networks.
In this paper, we present a mathematical relationship model between power consumption and TKIP encryption complexity. A simple and efficient low overhead TKIP (LOTKIP) technique is also proposed as a trade-off between security overhead and power consumption which is suitable for ad hoc wireless network security. We consider TKIP key mixing function and RC4 encryption algorithms specified in [11] for our analysis and simulations. Energy consumption models of 802.11b wireless device operation and cryptographic algorithm processing are used to simulate and validate the performance and efficiency of LOTKIP for specific scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.0 gives an account of related work in the field of wireless security optimisation and energy consumption models. We present an overview of TKIP algorithm in Section 3.0. The TKIP complexity model is analyzed in Section 4.0. Then, we explain LOTKIP details in section 5.0. The simulations and performance of LOTKIP are discussed in Section 6.0, followed by concluding remarks in Section 7.0.
RELATED WORK
Most wireless security algorithms are designed based on models that do not take into account the security performance together with computational complexity and energy cost. In [16] , a lightweight enhancement (LWE) to RC4 is proposed to operate in resource constrained wireless devices where 64-bit WEP is hardwired. The enhancement approach is based on derangement and complementation that use a block cipher mode of operation on top of 64-bit RC stream cipher to enhance security. LWE exponentially increase security strength with logarithmic expenditure of memory and power. State Based WEP presented by Srinivasan et al.
[21] provides a strong, lightweight encryption scheme for battery-constraint wireless devices.
Sate Based Key Hop saves significant processing power especially for packet sizes smaller than 200 bytes as would be seen in wireless networks by avoiding RC4 state initialization on every packet. It eliminates all the security issues with WEP using the existing hardware at a speed greater than WEP and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). It has been noted that the energy consumption of most cryptographic algorithms increases in their software instantiations [5] [20]. Hence, bulk data encryption and message authentication algorithms for wireless security are among the dominant power sink in mobile wireless devices. Jones et al. [12] and Lettieri & Srivastava [15] have shown that one of the main causes of unnecessary energy consumption is security overhead and communication protocol over a wireless channel. Adaptability and optimization of security protocols have thus emerged as a key issue for security in ad hoc resource-constrained networks. Two principles suggested for achieving an energy efficient security system are to avoid unnecessary computations and reduce the amount/size of encrypted data transmission [10] . However, existing security protocols for 802.11 wireless networks limit the efficient use of wireless station/node resources by significantly increasing amount of overhead required to secure data communication and decreasing throughput. Complex cryptographic processing also increases the delay between data transmissions. With unoptimized security protocols the data rates of wireless links decreases due to additional traffic or larger encrypted packet size incurred for authentication or verification services.
Essentially, security mechanisms increase overall power and energy consumption in wireless devices, since computationally complex encryption and decryption procedures require multiple arithmetic operations and more processing cycles. In [8] , the authors have measured the actual energy consumption of 802.11 wireless network interfaces operating in ad-hoc network environments and showed that the amount of energy consumption is directly proportional to the size of data to be sent or received. The energy consumption models for data communication (transmission and reception) is expressed as linear equation of the form, E = (m × size) + b, where the coefficients m and b depend on the type of communication, i.e., broadcast, unicast, or packet discarded, and can be determined empirically. Similarly, in [14] , the energy consumption per packet of cipher function is also modelled to be almost linear as a function of: a fixed cost (B) which is the energy overhead resulting from the computation required for key expansion process and is independent of the packet size, and a variable cost (A) that is dependent on the packet size. The overall model is simplified as E = B + xA for energy consumption per packet of size x bytes. These approved general models have been useful in performance evaluation of energy consumption of wireless security protocols.
Several techniques have been investigated in [14] [5] , to reduce energy consumption by limiting the duration transmission/reception of messages or designing more energy efficient idling techniques. Another active area of research interest is the optimization of security protocol efficiencies [7] [19] [13] . Prior work from Ganesan et al. [9] assesses the feasibility of different encryption schemes for a range of embedded architectures using execution time overhead measurements. Potlapally et al. [18] investigated energy consumption of different ciphers on the Secure Sockets Layer. Consequently, our work consolidates all earlier work on 802.11 wireless securities and adds to fill this void of, by investigating design of energy efficient and low overhead TKIP encryption in an ad hoc wireless network scenario.
TKIP ALGORITHM
In this section we review the basics of TKIP algorithm.
TKIP Basics
TKIP provides more security than WEP with no extra hardware. Based on specific redesigned attributes, TKIP algorithm fulfils the challenges of a higher security standard in the following ways: (i) Michael, a well-studied cryptographic message integrity code (MIC), is used for defeating forgeries. MIC is computed over the whole message and it also protects the source and destination address from falsification. (ii) A frame sequence numbering is used to defeat replay attacks. Out-of-order frames are flagged and replay attacks are mitigated.
Attackers cannot capture valid encrypted traffic and re-transmit it at a later time. (iii) A perframe key mixing function is employed to defeat weak key attacks. TKIP derives a unique RC4 key for each frame through key mixing process to mitigate attacks against weak WEP keys.
The increased length of the IV makes it possible to generate a larger number of different keys.
(iv) Lastly, a rekeying mechanism is included to defeat key collisions. TKIP is also equipped with key management operations. Another important constraint in the design of security mechanism for 802.11b and 802.11g mobile devices is the low-speed embedded CPU's which cannot support computationally intensive security operations. We node here the idea behind TKIP is compatibility with existing hardware while minimizing the impact of enhancement operations on the device performance.
In Figure 1 , the TKIP encryption/decryption process between two wireless stations, A and B, is shown. At station A, a MIC is generated for the data and appended to the message which is fragmented if greater than MPDU size. Next, the MAC Header is added and the whole packet is encrypted. Before de-encapsulating a received MAC Protocol Data Unit (MPDU) at station B, TKIP extracts the TKIP sequence counter (TSC), WEP IV and Key ID from the packet. However, TKIP discards received MPDU that violates the sequencing rules, and otherwise uses the mixing function to reconstruct a WEP seed. The TKIP WEP seed is represented as a concatenation of WEP IV and RC4 key and passes on these with the MPDU to WEP engine for de-encapsulation/decryption. If integrity check value (ICV) test is successful, the implementation reassembles the MPDU into a MAC Protocol Service Unit (MSDU). Upon successful MSDU reassembly, the receiver station B performs MIC verification step by recomputing the MIC over the MSDU source address, destination address, and MSDU data (but not the MIC field), and bit-wise comparing the resultant MIC against the received MIC.
Successful MIC verification means the MSDU can be delivered to the upper level. If two MICs differ in any bit position (interpreted as MIC failure), the receiver will discard the packet and will engage in appropriate countermeasures.
As specified in ref. [11] , TKIP MPDU is extended by 4 bytes to accommodate the new Extended IV (ExtIV) field and the MSDU format is expanded by 8 bytes, to accommodate the new MIC field. The simplified layout of the encrypted MPDU format is depicted in Figure 1 .
When the MSDU-with-MIC cannot be encoded within a single WEP-encapsulated MDPU, it is fragmented into appropriately sized MPDUs. The 4 bytes of ExtIV are added after the existing IV/Key ID Field, i.e. the IV and Key ID of 4 bytes is retained in the form as defined with baseline WEP. If the ExtIV bit is '0' only the WEP style non-extended IV is transferred. When the ExtIV bit is set and the Extended IV field is supplied for TKIP, this indicates presence of extended mode to the receiver. The transmitting/receiving station keeps track of the IV value of to detect key exhaustion. As noted in Figure 1 , the extended IV field is not encrypted [11] . All the MPDUs generated from one MSDU are encrypted under the same temporal key by TKIP.
TKIP employs non-reusable IVs as TKIP sequence counters (TSC) to prevent replay attacks [17] . With the same temporal or session key (TK), TSC is a monotonically increasing counter from 0x000 to 0xFFFF which starts from first packet transmission. The receiver rejects every packet that has a TSC less than or equal to the previous packet. When an IV sequence counter roll-over (0xFFFF --> 0x0000) is detected, the extended IV will be incremented. 
TKIP Countermeasures
MIC detects active attacks (unlike WEP's Integrity Check Value (ICV)) and countermeasures are employed to prevent persistent message forgery attacks. However, TKIP still uses ICV in conjunction with the MIC to prevent false detection of MIC failures, and therefore thwart false countermeasure initiation. TKIP takes active countermeasures when two MIC failures are detected in less than one minute [11] . For MIC failure rate above one per minute, the station basically deletes all keys and attempts to reassociate (re-keying the connection) once more after a waiting period. However, this also implies that the attacker needs only two MIC-invalid packets per minute to completely prevent Wi-Fi users accessing the network. Although, normal network operation can resume at least 60s after the second MIC failure, to prevent this countermeasure from being used as a pedestal for a denial of service attack, the MIC is checked last in the TKIP de-encapsulation/decryption process. The risk of false alarms is minimized when MIC is verified after the CRC, IV and other checks have been performed [11] . Frames with invalid ICV and TSC are discarded before the MIC is verified.
Thus, ICV ensures that noise and transmission errors do not erroneously trigger TKIP countermeasures. Another countermeasure, when a new temporal key cannot be established before the full 16-bit space TSC is exhausted, then TKIP protected communications will cease.
For key refresh failure, the implementation halts further data traffic until rekeying succeeds, or disassociates. Further, to strengthen the user authentication process, TKIP makes use of the 802.1x framework and the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) as proposed in [11] . But even when addressing all known flaws of WEP, TKIP does not protect against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, since the countermeasure can be used to launch a DoS attack on the network. DoS attack can exhaust resources such as bandwidth, memory, CPU, etc. Moreover, TKIP is designed in such a way that its security completely relies on the secrecy of all the packet keys [17] .
TKIP stronger security comes at the cost of performance degradation, in terms of higher complexity and overhead. Key mixing operation is designed to put a minimum demand on the stations and access points, yet have enough cryptographic strength so that it cannot easily be broken. Key-mixing would be more CPU-intensive if not solved by a two-phase mixing process. Phase 1 key mixing is static and one-off with high 32 bits of the IV, and only changes every 64K packets. Phase 2 is executed on per-packet basic, but since the counter is predictable, phase 2 can be computed in advance while waiting for the next packet(s) to arrive at receiver. Computing a few mixed keys in advanced is a gainful approach to minimize decryption response time for strict time-constraint applications. Furthermore, in ad hoc IEEE 802.11 wireless networks, the link throughput can be improved with an optimized TKIP mechanism.
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze and model the complexity of TKIP components.
Michael Complexity Analysis
Several viable implementations exist for secure message integrity checking, but the dilemma of the wireless LAN card is its limited finite computation capabilities. WPA uses where n is number of 32-bit words in message M.
Hence, the approximate number of processing cycles required for performing all operations in MIC is expressed as:
CRC Complexity Analysis
The fundamental mathematics behind CRC algorithm is polynomial division. The table look-up CRC algorithm method is used with pre-calculated CRC values as shown next:
Applying a similar complexity analysis approach, the number of processing cycles, T CRC-CALC , required for performing all basic operations in CRC for m bytes is expressed in general terms as:
Considering T and , T or , T mem and T shift to denote the numbers of processing cycles required for performing basic operations of a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, a byte memory access and a byte-wise SHIFT respectively. The approximate number of processing cycles required for CRC on m bytes is given as:
Key Mixing Complexity Analysis
For efficient computation, key mixing benefits from two phase operations as follows: The function MK16 constructs a 16-bit value from two 8-bit inputs as MK16(X,Y) = (256*X) + Y.
Phase I Key Mixing
We deduce the computational operations for Phase 1 key mixing as:
Considering T and , T or , and T mem to denote the number of processing cycles required for performing basic operations of a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, and a byte-wise substitution (SBT) from memory, respectively, we have:
And, if L = 8, we obtain:
Phase 2 Key Mixing
Phase 2 key mixing takes as input, TTAK (80 bits) with TK (128 bits) and the last 16 bits of IV to generate a unique 128-bit RC4 key, also known as WEP seed. It employs S-box substitution, rotate operation and addition operation to generate the 128-bit per-packet RC4 key (PPK). The 128-bit per-packet RC4 key has an internal structure that must conform to the WEP specification for compatibility. In both phase 1 and phase 2 key mixing function, an S-box is used for non-linear substitution and the strength of the cryptosystem depends heavily on the quality of the S-box lookup table [17] . The WEP seed is represented as an array of 8-bit values, The number of processing cycles for computational operations of phase 2 key mixing is:
For simplicity, a BytewiseMUL computation is computationally equivalent to 256
BytewiseADD, which is approximated to 256 BytewiseXOR. Again, assuming T and , T or , T rot and T mem denote the numbers of processing cycles required for performing basic operations of a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, and a byte-wise SBT from memory respectively.
In baseline TKIP, Phase Loop Count value is chosen as 8, this maintains a balance between robustness in key mixing and complexity of key generation. Subsequently, all next 16 bytes encryption computations incur:
Combining Both Key Mixing Computations

RC4 Complexity Analysis
Standard RC4 algorithm is analyzed to determine its computational workload. RC4 process consists of Key scheduling component (KSA) and Pseudo random generation module (PRGA)
to generate the key stream to be XOR with plaintext stream. 18 Number of processing cycles for computation of KSA is:
Approximating ADD and MOD to XOR computation complexity, we have:
Assuming T and , T or , and T swap denote the number of processing cycles required for performing basic operations of a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, and a byte-wise SWAP from, respectively. Thus, we have:
Number of processing cycles for computation of PRGA is:
Using T and , T or , T sub and T swap to denote the number of processing cycles required for performing basic operations of a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, a byte SUB and a byte-wise SWAP from, respectively, we obtain:
Overall RC4 complexity
The final operation in RC4 is to output ( Total number of processing cycles for m bytes of data encryption is, As shown on Table 1 and Figure 2 , the complexity of TKIP is observed to increase linearly with larger messages size (M). Without phase 1 caching, overall TKIP complexity increases at a rate of 5386 processing cycles per byte encryption. When Phase 1 key mixing caching scheme is applied, the computational complexity of TKIP is much lower now, which also explains that key mixing is has the most operational workload of all the components of TKIP. Comparatively, MIC complexity percentage contribution for messages up till 128 bytes of data is (0.8 -5.5%), CRC complexity part is (0.1 -1.0%), Key mixing complexity share is (88.9 -95.6%) and RC4 complexity involvement is (3.5 -4.6%). However, the larger the message size, the more complex it is to compute the MIC using Michael. For very large message sizes (of the order of Kilobytes) MIC function is expected to be the dominant complexity component. bytes ICV) associated with TKIP in an IEEE 802.11 frame, as summarized in Table 2 . Hence, TKIP extends the total length of a WEP encrypted MPDU by 12 bytes. IEEE 802.11 MSDU maximum size is explicitly 2304 bytes. The maximum MAC header and FCS overhead is 34
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bytes, but only frames between access points over a wireless distribution system use all MAC header fields.
TKIP Key Managment
For key refresh mechanism, TKIP deals with three types of keys that are hierarchical [11] [23]:
Master key (MK), Key Encryption key (KEK) and Temporal key (TK). Initially, a MK is exchanged among workstations through 802.1x authentication servers. MK is directly related to authentication and is used for secure distribution of key streams, i.e. it is created after a successful authentication and is related to one session only. Secondly, a pair of KEK is securely distributed between the authentication server and the wireless station via the AP using the MK.
One KEK is needed to encrypt distributed keying material, i.e. temporal keys, while a second KEK serves to protect re-key messages from forgery. The station and the access point then generate a separate pair of TK for each direction of transmission in an association. Each pair of TK consists of a 128-bit data encryption key and a second 64-bit key for data integrity. These keys are identified by a 2-bit key ID. New TKs are always created with the first connection or re-establishment of connection.
In wireless ad hoc network, a key management system is also needed to distribute authentication and encryption keys to stations securely. The absence of an Access Point makes key management and distribution a challenging task. For the functionality of LOTKIP in ad hoc network, we assume that it is possible to set pre-shared key among the wireless stations, i.e. In the traditional baseline TKIP approach, the key reason why the IV is transmitted in the clear is because the 802.11 standard assumes that an adversary does not gain any useful information from its knowledge. The IV is meant to introduce randomness to the key, and appending the clear IV in the transmitted packet helps the receiver to decrypt the information sent from the transmitter station. However, it has been proved that various types of attacks are possible using the IV knowledge as described in [22] [23] [3] . The proposed LOTKIP heals this problem, as well minimizes packet overhead and thus potentially saving on transmission energy.
SIMULATION AND EVALUATION
Energy Consumption Models
802.11 WLAN device usually operate in one of the following modes: Transmit or Receive or
Idle. When data bits are transmitted on the channel, the power consume is P T watts. When data bits are received and processed from the channel, the power consumed is P R watts. When the wireless card is idle, no transmission and reception of bits, the power spent is P I watts.
Assuming the time length for which the WLAN card is in transmit, receive and idle mode are T T , T R and T I respectively, the total energy consumed will be (P T × T T ) + (P R × T R ) + (P I × T I ).
The highest power is consumed in the transmit mode when transmitting packets or forwarding a packet in a multi-hop ad-hoc network. In the idle mode, a WLAN device is required to sense the medium and will be omitted in our simulation as it does not impact on our comparative analysis. We apply a linear energy consumption model for Lucent IEEE 802.11b wireless card operations as given in Feeney et al. [8] . According to this model, the energy consumption (E) in IEEE 802.11b networks is associated with the size of sent packets: E = (a × Size) + b, where a is the energy consumption per byte, and b is the overhead for sending a packet. The linear transmission and reception energy models for point-to-point transmission/receptions using IEEE 802.11b devices given by: T_Energy = 431 μJ + 0.48 μJ/bytes; and R_Energy = 316 μJ + 0.12 μJ/bytes, respectively [8] .
TKIP Energy Model
Using the experimental results in [16] where n = (m/32), n ≥ 1, m is the number of bytes encrypted after first packet.
Network Model
We evaluate and compare the performance of the baseline TKIP and LOTKIP schemes in randomly-generated network topologies using 49 static wireless stations that are either transmitters or receivers are randomly placed within a (500 m x 500 m) flat area. The quasi unit-disk graph (Quasi-UDG) model is used to simulate the non-uniform characteristics of wireless networks [6] . A Quasi-UDG with transmission range parameters R and Quasi-UDG factor α ( 0 ≤ α ≤ 1) over a set of positions in the network is defined as follows: For any two ad hoc wireless stations at positions u and v in the network with inter-station distance |uv|: if |uv| ≤ αR then a link exists between wireless station at u and v in the network; if |uv| > R then stations at u and v are not within direct transmission/reception range; and if αR < |uv| ≤ R then stations at u and v is connected probabilistically. We simulate 100 different scenarios of randomly selected transmitter-receiver pairs among the 49 nodes in the ad hoc wireless network and the results are averaged. In this simulation, we assumed the receiver node cannot be compromised and there is an existing key management system as described previously.
Results and Discussions
The maximum IEEE 802.11 MSDU size is 2312 octets before the frame body is encrypted.
Frames are fragmented and tested from 256 to 2312 bytes length. 10,000 packets of size (P) are transmitted from randomly selected sources and destinations in the 49 nodes ad hoc network.
End-to-end baseline TKIP (without key caching) encryption/decryption is applied to secure communication. The simulation is run for grid distribution and random distribution ad hoc nodes. 20 bytes header is appended to the packets P to form the TKIP encapsulated frames. The total energy consumption by all nodes in the network (Network Energy Consumption/Joules) is plotted in Figure 4 . The dotted lines represent the results for random ad hoc wireless network. faster rate compare to LOTKIP as the packet size gets bigger. Therefore, LOTKIP could be a better scheme to transmit larger packets securely at lower network energy cost. The simple and efficient optimization scheme in LOTKIP shows lower overhead and energy saving. Since all packets depend of the first LOTKIP packet which contained the IV part, this packet is of high importance. In our simulation we assumed that this critical packet is not lost or intercepted by adversaries. In real network transmissions, the first LOTKIP packet can be treated in priority and delivered securely by VNP tunneling techniques.
However, we have not studied the energy consumption of WLAN attacks, such as denial of service attacks, related security countermeasures of LOTKIP. One approach to measure the efficiency of LOTKIP, and study how to minimize energy drain due to wireless LAN attacks, is to gauge its resilience to cryptanalysis attacks, such as brute-force attack, differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis.
CONCLUSION
TKIP encryption/decryption is one of the persistent overhead in wireless security for the entire communication session. In this paper, we have described, LOTKIP, a simple and optimized wireless security protocol that carries out power-efficient encryption and decryption. A mathematical complexity model of TKIP has been derived in terms of processing cycles of its basic operations and adapted to study the performance of LOTKIP. LOTKIP decreases complexity of wireless encryption while making LOTKIP frame transmission energy efficient.
